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Abstract
We study the effect of rising Chinese import competition in the early 2000s on banks’ credit 
supply policies. Using bank-fi rm-level data on the universe of Spanish corporate loans, we 
exploit heterogeneity across banks in the exposure of their loan portfolios towards fi rms 
competing with Chinese imports. Exposed banks rebalanced their loan portfolios by cutting 
the supply of credit to fi rms affected by Chinese competition, while raising their lending
towards non-exposed sectors. This portfolio reallocation depressed further the economic 
activity of fi rms competing with Chinese imports.
Keywords: trade shock, credit register, banks’ portfolio reallocation, bank loans, real effects.
JEL classifi cation: G21, G32, F65.
Resumen
Este artículo estudia el efecto del aumento en la competencia de las importaciones chinas 
a principios de la década de los 2000 en las políticas de oferta de crédito de los bancos 
españoles. El uso de información a nivel banco-empresa del universo de préstamos concedidos 
a empresas no fi nancieras españolas nos permite explotar la heterogeneidad existente entre 
los bancos, en términos de la exposición de sus carteras de préstamos a empresas que 
compiten con las importaciones chinas. Los bancos más expuestos a este último grupo de 
empresas equilibraron sus carteras reduciendo la oferta de crédito a las empresas afectadas
por la competencia china y, a su vez, aumentando el crédito a los sectores no afectados. 
Esta reasignación del crédito deprimió, aún más, la actividad económica de las empresas que 
competían con las importaciones chinas.
Palabras clave: shock comercial, registro de crédito, préstamos bancarios, reasignación de 
la cartera crediticia, efectos reales.
Códigos JEL: G21, G32, F65.
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1The China Syndrome is consistent with the results of Bernard et al. (2006) on the negative effects of the
exposure to low-wage countries import competition on plant survival and growth. The rise of China exports
has also affected local labor markets, causing a decline in employment and wages (e.g., Autor et al., 2013,
2014), and an increase in political polarization (e.g., Autor et al., 2017b).
1 Introduction
Over the recent decades China has progressively integrated into the world econ-
omy through a process which has changed dramatically global trade flows. The
share of world manufacturing export accounted for by China rose from 2% in
1990 to 4% in 2000, and then increased even more rapidly, reaching a value of
11% in 2010. The rising Chinese competition has had widespread consequences
on advanced economies: firms operating in sectors more exposed to competitive
pressures from Chinese imports experienced a sharp drop in profitability, sales,
employment, capital expenditures, and innovation (e.g., Xu, 2012; Acemoglu
et al., 2016; Bloom et al., 2016; Autor et al., 2017a; Pierce and Schott, 2016;
Hombert and Matray, 2018), a phenomenon which has been referred to as the
“China Syndrome”.1
This paper studies the effect of the increase of Chinese imports competition in
the early 2000s on banks’ credit supply policies. To do so, we merge bank-firm-
level information from the Spanish Credit Registry, which covers the universe
of Spanish corporate loans, with balance-sheet information on banks and firms.
The Spanish economy represents an ideal case as firms are highly bank dependent
(e.g., Delgado et al., 2007). In this way, we can exclude the possibility that any
variation in bank loans is substituted with alternative sources of financing.
To understand the impact of import penetration on bank lending, we exploit
heterogeneity across banks in the exposure of their loan portfolios towards firms
competing with China. The import penetration has been heterogeneously dis-
tributed across industries within the manufacturing sector: roughly half of Span-
ish imports from China were concentrated in five three-digit NACE industries
(i.e., rubber, footwear, industrial machineries, toys, and textiles). Thus, banks
that in 2000 were lending relatively more to firms operating in these industries
had a larger exposure to the drop in firms’ ability to meet debt obligations trig-
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2For instance, the least and most exposed banks are located just 50 km apart, they are both local saving
banks, both very concentrated in just few industries, with the only difference that one bank was lending to
firms operating in the agriculture sector, whereas the other was providing credit to footwear firms.
gered by the dramatic rise of Chinese import competition. Importantly, banks’
exposure to Chinese imports does not correlate with observable characteristics of
banks’ balance sheets or loan portfolios.2
Since the rise of Chinese imports could be driven by Spanish demand factors,
we sharpen the identification of the effects of the exposure to import penetration
with a strategy similar to Autor et al. (2013, 2014, 2017a,b) and Acemoglu et al
(2016): we instrument the exposure of Spanish industries to China import com-
petition with the sectoral exposures of a pool of non-E.U. advanced economies.
Under the identifying restriction that demand shocks across these advanced coun-
tries are weakly correlated, our instrumenting strategy isolates the supply-side
component which caused the massive worldwide rise of Chinese exports. Indeed,
during the 1990s China undertook a transition to a market-oriented economy
which boosted aggregate productivity (e.g., Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Brandt
et al., 2012; Zhu, 2012; Hsieh and Ossa, 2016). We also consider an alternative
strategy which instruments import penetration with shipping costs (e.g., Bernard
et al., 2006; Valta, 2012; Barrot et al., 2018, 2019).
Our baseline regression shows that banks exposed to import penetration cut
the supply of credit between 2000 and 2006 to firms operating in sectors compet-
ing with Chinese goods. Yet, banks did not shrink their balance sheets, as they
rebalanced their loan portfolios by raising the lending to firms in non-exposed
sectors. Hence, banks shielded their balance sheets from the drop in profitability
of firms competing with Chinese imports by shifting their loan portfolios away
from these industries. The change in credit supply associated with bank expo-
sure to import penetration is identified through multi-bank firms and within-firm
variation in credit, as in Khwaja and Mian (2008). We also consider an alter-
native setting in which we control for the credit demand of all firms with the
combination of sector-province fixed effects and firm controls.
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To dig deeper on the process of credit reallocation to non-exposed sectors, we
split non-exposed firms into manufacturing firms, services firms, and construc-
tion firms, and explore the credit supply channel of import competition within
each of these three samples. Although we find that banks reallocate their loan
portfolios towards firms in all these non-exposed sectors, the evidence on the
surge in credit supply to construction firms is stronger and more robust across
all specifications. Moreover, while the rise in lending towards non-exposed manu-
facturing and services firms worked only through the intensive margin (i.e., firms
with existing credit relationship in 2000), the extra supply of credit to construc-
tion firms was channeled both by establishing new credit relationships and by
raising the amount of lending to firms with established bank connections.
The reallocation of credit supply from exposed manufacturing to non-exposed
industries – and especially to construction – could be driven by confounding
factors that in the early 2000s were shaping changes in the sectoral allocation
of credit. For instance, Chakraborty et al. (2018), Cun˜at et al. (2018), Martin
et al. (2018) show that banks reacted to the housing boom by shifting their
loans to construction firms and mortgage lending. We provide evidence that
the reallocation to construction holds above and beyond bank exposure to local
changes in either house prices or overall mortgage credit. In addition, bank
exposure to China competition could also capture a variation in lending policies
associated to the process of structural transformation out of manufacturing (e.g.,
Bustos et al., 2016, 2017). Yet, this possibility is inconsistent with the fact that
exposed bank adjusted their loan portfolios even within the manufacturing sector,
from exposed to non-exposed industries. To further rule out these alternative
hypotheses, we consider a placebo exercise in which we consider the effects of
bank exposure to non-exposed manufacturing in 2000. Consistently with the
premise that bank exposure to import competition does not capture potential
confounding factors, this measure implies no credit reallocation whatsoever to
services and construction.
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Then, why did exposed banks tend to shift their loan portfolios mainly to
construction firms? The increase in the supply of credit to construction firms is
stronger if banks are located in areas with fewer investment opportunities, that
is, areas in which there are relatively fewer firms that operate in non-exposed
industries outside of the construction sector. Hence, the marked spatial agglom-
eration of manufacturing industries (e.g., Krugman, 1991; Ellison and Glaeser,
1997; Ellison et al., 2010) implies that banks with highly geographically con-
centrated lending could mainly shield their balance sheet from the decline in
profitability of the industries competing with Chinese imports by shifting their
loans to construction firms.
The credit supply channel of foreign import penetration had large real effects.
In addition to confirming the findings of previous studies indicating that rising
imports depressed the economic activity of firms operating in sector subject to
the competition of Chinese goods, we highlight a new channel through which
these firms experienced a further drop in their real outcomes triggered by the
cut in the supply of credit from exposed banks. This novel mechanism accounts
for between one third and two thirds of the negative effects due to firms’ direct
exposure to foreign imports. On the one hand, a one-standard deviation increase
in the direct sectoral exposure to Chinese imports reduced sales, value added, and
employment in exposed manufacturing firms between 2000 and 2006 by 24.1%,
17.2%, and 10%, respectively. On the other hand, a one-standard deviation
increase in bank exposure to Chinese imports reduced sales, value added, and
employment in exposed manufacturing firms by 8.3%, 6%, and 7.5%.
Finally, we show that banks’ portfolio reallocation triggered a surge in the real
outcomes on firms in non-exposed sectors. This effect is particularly relevant –
and statistically significant – for construction firms, as a one-standard deviation
increase in bank exposure to China raised sales, value added, and employment
of the construction sector between 2000 and 2006 by roughly 6%.
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1.1 Related Literature
Although there is a vast literature that studies how foreign import penetration
affects firms and households, the effects on the credit market have attracted much
less attention. Among the few exceptions, Barrot et al. (2018) find that areas
more exposed to Chinese imports had a faster rise in households’ demand for
mortgages. We complement this study by focusing on the supply of loans to firms,
rather than households’ credit demand. In addition, Xu (2012), Valta (2012), and
Autor et al. (2017a) document that firms exposed to foreign import competition
experienced a drop in debt, and an increase in financing costs. Our contribution
to these papers is threefold. First, we identify the role of credit supply in the
change of overall corporate loans by isolating credit demand through multi-bank
firms, as in Khwaja and Mian (2008). Second, we show that the drop in credit
of firms competing with Chinese imports came with an increase in lending to
firms in non-exposed sectors, through banks’ decisions to rebalance their loan
portfolios. Third, we trace the real effects of all these changes in credit supply.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the role of banks’ internal capital
markets (e.g., Gan, 2007; Houston et al., 2007; Desai et al., 2008; Gilje et al.,
2016; Cortes and Strahan, 2017; Chakraborty et al., 2018; Cun˜at et al., 2018;
Martin et al., 2018), which tends to focus on how banks propagate either positive
or negative shocks across different geographical regions or lending types. Instead,
this paper studies banks’ reallocation of loan portfolios across different industries,
as in Martin et al. (2018) and De Jonghe et al. (2019). In particular, we
show that the rise of Chinese imports can be viewed as a negative shock to
the ability to repay debt obligations to firms operating in industries facing this
extra amount of competition, and banks used their internal capital markets to
reallocate their portfolios aways from these industries. This mechanism resembles
the theory emphasized by Stein (1997) and Scharfstein and Stein (2000), in which
a constrained business reallocates its limited resources from the least deserving
project to the most profitable ones. In this sense, the closest paper to ours is
Chakraborty et al. (2018), which documents how banks’ exposure to the housing
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price boom generate a crowding-out of credit from commercial lending towards
mortgage lending.
Finally, we add to the literature on the bank lending channel (e.g., Kashyap
and Stein, 1995; Khwaja and Mian, 2008; Jimenez et al., 2012; Chodorow-Reich,
2014; Amiti and Weinstein, 2018; Huber, 2018), by documenting that banks
changed their credit supply policies amidst the dramatic rise of Chinese imports.
2 Data and Methodology
2.1 The Rise of China
The last two decades have witnessed dramatic variations in the structure of global
trade flows, and the lion’s share of these changes consists in the massive increase
in the amount of Chinese manufacturing goods which are exported worldwide.
This pattern can be noted by looking at Figure 1, which reports the share of
Chinese manufacturing exports, as a fraction of world manufacturing exports,
from 1991 to 2015. This share has been constantly trending up: it was 2% in
1991, increased up to 4% in 2000, and then has accelerated substantially in the
early 2000s, by reaching a value of 11% in 2010. Figure 1 shows also that even
the share of Spanish imports of Chinese manufacturing goods, as a fraction of
Spanish GDP, displays a very similar trend. Indeed, the share of Chinese imports
in total GDP has doubled in just six years, from a value of 2.8% in 2000 up to
5.5% in 2006. Interestingly, Chinese imports have kept increasing even amidst
the sharp contraction of the Spanish economy from 2008 on, and reached 8% of
GDP in 2010. These dynamics track very closely the changes in the amount of
Chinese imports experienced by the U.S. economy, both in terms of levels and
relative changes over time.
What did cause this dramatic increase in the relevance of China as a global
exporting hub? The Chinese economy underwent two decades of reforms and
sharp changes in its production structure, such as the liberalization of private
economic activity and the transformation towards a market-oriented economy,
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the fostering of a better reallocation of resources, the rural-to-urban migration
of millions of households, the access to foreign technologies and intermediate in-
puts, and the access to the WTO. These reforms have boosted Chinese aggregate
productivity (e.g., Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Brandt et al., 2012; Zhu, 2012; Hsieh
and Ossa, 2016). According to the measure of TFP provided by the Penn World
Table, aggregate productivity in China grew at an annual rate of 4.7% between
2000 and 2007, whereas in the United States the growth rate of productivity
during the same period was just 1%, and Spain experienced a stagnation in the
level of productivity. As a result, the relative competitive advantage of Chinese
goods has substantially increased over the recent years.
Figure 1: The Rise of Chinese Imports.
2.2 Chinese Import Penetration
To measure the impact of the rising penetration of Chinese goods in the Spanish
economy at the sectoral level, we follow the approach of Acemoglu et al. (2016)
and exploit the industry-level changes in import and export between Spain and
Note: This graph reports the ratio of Chinese imports over total world exports
(continuous line - measured on the left y-axis), the ratio of Spanish imports from
China over Spanish GDP (dashed line - measured on the right y-axis), and the
ratio of U.S. imports from China over U.S. GDP (squared line - measured on the
right y-axis). All series are reported from 1991 and 2015. Source: UN Comtrade
and WorldBank.
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which corresponds to the ratio of the changes in the imported goods of each sector
between 2000 and 2006 over the total absorption capacity of each industry, where
Ms and Xs denote Chinese imports and exports of goods of sector s, respectively,
and Ys is total sales of Spanish firms operating in sector s. Throughout the paper,
all variables are defined in annualized terms.
where ΔMs,2000−2006 denotes the overall change in the imports of goods of sector s
in these foreign economies. To deal with the different magnitude of the numerator
and denominator, we standardize the former such that the maximum value of
ΔIP s,2006−2000 equals the maximum value of ΔIPs,2006−2000.
This instrumenting strategy isolates the supply component of the rise in the
competitiveness of Chinese goods. Under the identifying restriction that demand
shocks are weakly correlated across countries, this approach captures the part of
rising imports of Chinese goods which is due to the improvements in the aggregate
productivity of the Chinese economy. Moreover, this instrument is highly relevant
as the first-stage regression of ΔIPs,2006−2000 on ΔIP s,2006−2000 gives a coefficient
of 0.68, with a standard error of 0.02 and a R2 that equals 0.85.
China. Namely, we define the change in the Chinese import penetration for a
specific sector s between 2000 and 2006 as
ΔIPs,2006−2000 =
ΔMs,2000−2006
Ys,2000 +Ms,2000 −Xs,2000 (1)
Although Chinese imports have increased dramatically – and asymmetrically
across industries – from the year 2000 on, these dynamics could also be driven by
demand motives internal to the Spanish economy. To rule out this possibility, in
the empirical analysis we follow Autor et al. (2013, 2014, 2017a,b) and instrument
the changes in the Chinese import penetration with an analogous index which
exploits the variation in the imports of Chinese goods in a pool of non-E.U.
advanced countries, consisting of Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and
the United States. Thus, the instrument is defined as
ΔIP s,2006−2000 =
ΔMs,2000−2006
Ys,2000 +Ms,2000 −Xs,2000 (2)
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We also consider an alternative instrumental strategy that borrows from
Bernard et al. (2006), Valta (2012), and Barrot et al. (2018, 2019). Namely,
we instrument the sectoral import penetration index ΔIPs,2006−2000 with ship-
ping costs SCs,2000 measured by Bernard et al. (2006). These authors compute
freight rates – defined as the markup of the ratio of freight costs over the total
ΔIP b,2000−2006 =
∑
f∈s
[
Cb,f,s,2000 ×ΔIP s,2000−2006
]
∑
f Cb,f,s,2000
. (4)
value of imports – at the industry level by using the product-level U.S. import
data of Feentra (1996). Although these costs are defined as a reference to the
U.S. economy, this instrument is highly relevant as the first-stage regression of
ΔIPs,2006−2000 on SCs,2000 gives a coefficient of 0.47, with a standard error of
0.15 and an R2 that equals 0.71. This result highlights that the freight costs
capture technological costs of imports at the industry-level which do not vary
substantially depending on the final-importing country.
Then, we compute a measure of bank exposure to foreign import competition,
which captures the exposure of bank corporate loan portfolios towards firms com-
peting with Chinese imports. Accordingly, the change in the import penetration
between 2000 and 2006 for a given bank b weights the sectoral import penetration
index with the share of credit that bank b grants to each firm f in sector s, that
is
ΔIPb,2000−2006 =
∑
f∈s [Cb,f,s,2000 ×ΔIPs,2000−2006]∑
f Cb,f,s,2000
, (3)
where Cb,f,s,2000 denotes the overall amount of lending between bank b and firm f
operating in sector s as of 2000. Analogously to the case of the index of sectoral
import penetration, we rule out any possible demand component in bank expo-
sure to Chinese competition by instrumenting the bank import penetration with
an index which is built using the import flows of a panel of non-E.U. advanced
countries, that is
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Although ΔIP b,2000−2006 is the baseline instrument, we also consider a instrument
which is based on shipping costs, which is
SCb,2000 =
∑
f∈s [Cb,f,s,2000 × SCs,2000]∑
f Cb,f,s,2000
. (5)
Finally, we use an alternative measure of bank exposure to foreign imports,
which defines bank specialization in the set of manufacturing firms which are
competing with Chinese goods, in the spirit of De Jonghe et al. (2019). Bank
specialization SPECb,2000 is defined as the share of credit of a given bank to the
manufacturing industries exposed to Chinese competition over the overall size of
corporate loans of that given bank as of 2000, that is
SPECb,2000 =
∑
f∈ exposed manuf.Cb,f,2000∑
f Cb,f,2000
. (6)
Bank specialization captures the extent to which the corporate loan portfolio of
a bank is tilted towards exposed manufacturing firms. This alternative measure
of bank exposure to exposed manufacturing firms is a special case of the bank
exposure index of Equation (3) which abstracts from the variation of the index
of import penetration across sectors ΔIPs,2000−2006.
2.3 Data
To carry out the analysis of this paper, we merge industry-level information on
import and export flows between Spain and China, with data on credit flows
among banks and firms, and balance sheet information on both bank and firms.
We merge all these sources of data and build a sample that ranges over the period
2000-2006. On the one hand, we follow Barrot et al. (2018) and start in the year
2000 to capture the implications of the access of China to the WTO. Although
the WTO membership started officially in the late 2001, the normalization of the
trade relationship of advanced economies with China started in the early 2000
under the push of the Clinton administration. On the other hand, we stop in
the year 2006 to avoid that our analysis could be influenced by any confounding
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Spanish economy throughout the Great Recession period.
We derive measures of bank and sectoral exposure to China import compe-
tition by using data on international trade at the industry level, following the
same steps of Autor et al. (2013), adapted to the case of the Spanish economy.
The information on international trade at the sectoral level comes from the UN
Comtrade Database. This database contains bilateral imports for six-digit Har-
monized Commodity Description and Coding System products. Besides the data
on the imports and exports of each sector from Spain to China, we use similar in-
formation on imports and exports of the same sectors in other non-E.U. advanced
countries: Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States.
Since the industry classification at the UN Comtrade Database differs from
the standard classification method used in the European Union, we need to con-
vert the six-digit HS product codes to the European standards. This conversion
consists of two stages. First, we convert six-digit HS product codes to 1987 SIC
codes using a crosswalk from Autor et al. (2013). Second, we convert 1987
SIC codes to the Statisical Classification of Economic Activities in the European
Community, commonly referred to as NACE (for the French term “Nomencla-
ture statistique des activite´s e´conomiques dans la Communaute´ europe´enne”).
More specifically, we convert the 1987 SIC codes to 3-digit NACE industries and
then to CNAE-93 (the Spanish analogue to NACE Rev 1.1). We end up with
information on Chinese imports for 252 industries at the 3-digit level of CNAE
codes.
Table 1 reports the top-5 industries in terms of the import penetration index.
Similarly to the case for the U.S. economy documented by Autor et al. (2013,
2014), the rise of Chinese imports has been very concentrated in few industries,
that is, those producing rubber, footwear, industrial machineries, toys, and tex-
tiles. These five industries account for almost a half of the total increase of
factor connected to the deep financial and banking crisis which characterized the
Spanish imports from China, highlighting the fact that the competitive threats
of Chinese imports have affected asymmetrically Spanish production sectors.
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To understand the effects of Chinese import competition on the corporate
loan market, we exploit the data of the Spanish Credit Register. This dataset,
which is collected by the Bank of Spain in its role of banking supervisor, reports
detailed monthly information on the credit position of each Spanish firm with
each Spanish bank at the monthly frequency, for all loans above 6,000 euros.
These characteristics guarantee that de-facto we are observing the entire corpo-
rate loan market of the Spanish economy. This source of data has already been
used by Jimenez et al. (2012, 2014, 2019) and Bentolilla et al. (2018).
Since the Credit Register reports the identifier of each bank and firm, we
merge the loan-level data with the balance sheets on the entire universe of banks
and firms. The data on banks is collected by the Bank of Spain in its role
of banking supervisor, and includes information on total assets, the holdings
of cash and fixed income, the amount of net worth, and EBITDA. The data
on firms come from the Spanish Commercial Register, which covers almost the
entire universe of Spanish companies, and includes also information on firms’
identifier and name, industry of operation, total assets, equity, cash holdings,
Table 1: Top-5 Industries by Chinese Import Penetration.
Industry Import Penetration
Rubber 12.91
Footwear 11.86
Industrial Machineries 9.81
Toys 8.70
Textile 8.66
Note: This table reports the five sectors
characterized by the highest values for the
average annual change in the import penetration
of Chinese goods between 2000 and 2006,
ΔIPs,2000−2006.
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EBITDA, total sales, value added, and the number of employees. Moreover, we
can identify each bank-firm relationship by aggregating loans within each bank-
firm pair. This feature allows us to trace all the changes in credit flows between
a given bank and a given firm over time. Unfortunately, the Credit Register
collects information only on the quantities of each loan and not on the interest
rates. Nevertheless, the dataset reports information on each bank-firm pair in
which either firms have missed to pay back their debt obligations or the bank
considers the loan as doubtful, i.e., the bank considers that it is likely that the
firm will miss a payment in the near future. In this way, we are able to compute
the ratio of doubtful and non-performing loans over total loans.
With all these sources of information, we build a panel of both real variables
and credit data on 123,508 firms, 162 banks, and 300,579 firm-bank observations.
Table 2 reports some descriptive statistics on the the change in total credit of all
firms, and firms across different sectors (i.e., exposed and non-exposed manufac-
turing firms, services firms, and constructions and real estate firms), as well as
key firm characteristics.
Figure 2 reports the values of the exposure to Chinese imports for each of
the 162 banks in our samples. The figure shows that there is substantial hetero-
geneity in the way the rise of China has affected the loan portfolios of Spanish
financial institutions. Indeed, bank exposure to import penetration (bank import
penetration hereafter) ranges between 0 and 5%, with a mean value close to 2%.
Heterogeneity in bank exposure to Chinese imports is not correlated with
bank observable characteristics. Indeed, Table 3 reports some key bank char-
acteristics, such as the size of the balance sheet, the fraction of liquid assets,
leverage, the profitability, the fraction of non-performing loans, and a measure of
the diversification of the loan portfolio across provinces and sectors, for the banks
in the top tercile of the bank import penetration vis-a`-vis all other banks. The
table shows that banks with lowest and highest exposure to China have no sta-
tistically significant difference in any of these characteristics. Importantly, banks
with higher levels of exposure to China are not less diversified than less exposed
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Note: Panel A of this table reports the descriptive statistics on the change in log credit between 2000 and
2006 at the firm level, with information also at the sectoral level. Panel B reports the descriptive statistics
on other selected firm variables, that is, firm total assets, the ratio of equity over firm total assets, the ratio
of liquid assets over firm total assets, and the return on assets (ROA). P5 denotes the fifth percentile, P95
denotes the ninety-fifth percentile, SD is the standard deviation, and N is the number of observations.
Figure 2: Bank Exposure to Import Competition.
Note: This graph reports the values in percentage points of the change in banks’
exposure to foreign import competition from 2000 to 2006, ΔIPb,2000−2006.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics.
Mean Median P5 P95 SD N
Panel A. ΔLog (Credit2000−2006)
All Firms 0.13 0.11 -0.79 0.97 0.56 300,579
Exposed 0.11 0.08 -0.80 0.96 0.56 84,896
Manufacturing Firms
Non-Exposed 0.12 0.10 -0.77 0.93 0.555 111,113
Manufacturing Firms
Services Firms 0.14 0.14 -0.76 0.96 0.56 45.144
Construction Firms 0.17 0.16 -0.84 1.07 0.61 59,425
Panel B. Firm Characteristics
Total Assets (TA) (,000) 1752.10 301.71 30.18 2885.00 17708.59 123,508
Equity/TA 0.27 0.24 -0.17 0.81 0.30 123,508
Liquid Assets/TA 0.11 0.06 -0.01 0.45 0.16 123,508
ROA 0.11 0.10 -0.09 0.35 0.14 123,508
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 21 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1908
financial institutions. Banks tend to have a portfolio rather concentrated across
industries and provinces independently on their exposure to foreign imports. For
instance, the banks with the lowest and highest exposure to China are both local
banks, both operate in the same geographical area as the two headquarters are
50 kilometres apart, and both banks are highly concentrated in very few indus-
tries. The only difference is that the least exposed bank is specialized in lending
to agriculture firms whereas the most exposed bank supplies credit to footwear
Note: This table reports bank characteristics for banks with high exposure to China, defined as
the banks in the top tercile in terms of bank exposure to Chinese imported goods ΔIPb,2000−2006,
and banks with low exposure to China, defined as the banks in the lowest two terciles in terms of
bank exposure to Chinese imported goods ΔIPb,2000−2006. The bank characteristics are the log of
total assets, the ratio of liquid assets over total liabilities in percentage values, the ratio of equity
over total liabilities in percentage values, the fraction of non-performing loans (NPLs) in percentage
values, the return on assets (ROA) in percentage values, and the average share of banks’ overall total
corporate credit loans which is concentrated at the province-sector level in percentage values. The last
column reports the difference between the values in bank characteristics across the two groups of banks,
with the values in brackets reporting the standard errors associated with a test of difference in the means.
companies. Hence, larger values of the bank import penetration are due to the
fact that some banks had a corporate loan portfolio relatively more tilted to those
sectors which have suffered the most the increased competition of Chinese goods.
Table 3: Bank Import Penetration and Bank Characteristics
Banks with Low Banks with High Difference
Exposure to China Exposure to China
Log Total Assets 13.09 13.91 -0.92
(0.56)
Liquid Assets/Total Liabilities (%) 14.27 14.24 0.03
(1.48)
Equity/Total Liabilities (%) 9.77 8.87 0.90
(1.01)
NPLs (%) 1.72 1.40 0.32
(0.22)
ROA (%) 0.81 0.92 -0.11
(0.07)
Average Credit Share 20.57 16.80 3.78
at Province-Sector Level (%) (2.33)
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3 Import Competition and Credit Supply
How did the rising Chinese import penetration affect the Spanish corporate loan
market? We start by providing some prima-facie evidence on the changes in
both the ability to meet debt obligations and the total amount of credit among
firms with different degrees of exposure to the competitive pressures of Chinese
imported goods.
Panel A of Figure 3 plots the dynamics of the cumulative fraction of non-
performing loans (NPLs) of firms exposed to Chinese competition vis-a`-vis the
non-performing loans of non-exposed firms between 1994 and 2006. Both lines
are normalized to 1 in 2000. The figure shows that the cumulative NPLs of non-
exposed firms have grown at a constant rate over these year, from a value of 1%
in 1994 to 1.6% in 2000, and 2.5% in 2006. Instead, although the growth rate
of the NPLs of exposed firms has been very similar to the one of non-exposed
firms in the early years, from 2000 on the fraction of loans to exposed firms with
repayment issues has more than doubled, from 2.3% to 4.9%. These dynamics
are consistent with the notion that the dramatic rise in the import penetration
of Chinese goods from 2000 has negatively affected the profitability of firms in
exposed sectors (e.g., Xu, 2012; Autor et al., 2017a; Hombert and Matray, 2018),
which has resulted in a rapid increase of the likelihood that exposed firms could
not meet their debt obligations, with their loans turning into non-performing.
Panel B of Figure 3 reports a similar plot on total bank credit of exposed
and non-exposed firms. Although the entire period of time is characterized by a
progressive loosening of financial conditions which triggered a rise in the overall
amount of corporate credit (e.g., Martin et al., 2018; Jimenez et al., 2019), again
there is a substantial asymmetry in the dynamics of total loans from the year 2000
on, such as total credit grows much faster among non-exposed firms. Roughly,
bank credit of non-exposed firms has doubled from 2000 to 2006, whereas it has
increased by just 40% among exposed firms. This finding is consistent with the
results of Xu (2012), on the negative effects of import penetration on firms’ overall
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Note: Panel A reports the cumulative ratio of non-performing and doubtful loans over total loans
for both firms exposed to Chinese import competition (continuous line) and firms not exposed
to Chinese import competition (dashed line), from 1994 to 2006. Both lines are normalized to
1 in 2000. Panel B reports the total amount of bank loans for firms exposed to Chinese import
competition (continuous line) and the total amount of bank loans for firms not exposed to Chinese
import competition (dashed line), from 1994 to 2006. Both lines are normalized to 1 in 2000.
debt positions. Again, the figure shows the absence of pre-existing trends, as the
dynamics of credit of exposed and non-exposed firms are remarkably similar from
1994 to 2000.
Why did bank credit of exposed firms decline relatively to the amount of loans
of non-exposed firms? Although this trend looks to be driven by the sudden
surge of the foreign import competition, the change in corporate credit could
be explained by demand motives, with firms reducing their outstanding credit
Figure 3: Non-Performing Loans and Credit Across Exposed and Non-Exposed Firms.
(A) Non-Performing Loans
(B) Credit
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where ΔCb,f,s,2000−2006 is the change between 2000 and 2006 in the amount of
credit from bank b to firm f operating in sector s. The coefficient β1 captures
the effect of bank exposure to China to its credit supply towards firms in non-
exposed sectors, whereas the coefficient β2 informs on how the changes in bank
credit supply depend on firms’ direct exposure to Chinese import competition.
As long as the estimated signs of the coefficients β1 and β2 differ between each
other, then bank exposure to China causes asymmetric changes in credit supply
across industries with different direct exposure to foreign imports.
This regression includes a set of bank controls Xb,2000, such as as the size
of the balance sheet (i.e., log of total assets), the liquidity ratio (i.e., the ratio
of cash plus fixed income over total assets), leverage (i.e., the ratio of net worth
over total assets), the fraction of NPLs (i.e., the ratio of doubtful assets over total
assets), ROA (i.e., the ratio of EBITDA over assets), sector specialization (i.e.,
the fraction of credit granted to firms in a given sector over total credit), province
specialization (i.e., the fraction of credit granted to firms in a given province over
to boost their ability to meet their debt obligations, or by supply factors, with
banks reducing the lending to firms exposed to Chinese competition to prevent
a large surge of NPLs. To disentangle these possibilities and isolate uniquely the
role of credit supply, in what follows we exploit the bank-firm-level dimension of
our data.
3.1 The Causal Effect on Bank Credit Supply
We identify the causal effect of banks’ exposure to China on their credit supply
policies by explicitly taking into account the fact that banks’ exposure to China
could influence asymmetrically the supply of credit towards firms, depending on
firms’ direct exposure to Chinese import competition. To unveil these patterns,
we run the regression
ΔCb,f,s,2000−2006 = β1ΔIPb,2000−2006 + β2ΔIPb,2000−2006 ×ΔIPs,2000−2006 + . . .
· · ·+X′b,2000β3 + δf + b,f,s,2000−2006 (7)
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total credit), and relationship lending (e.g., a dummy variable that equals 1 if
bank b is the bank with the highest share of credit for firm f).
Crucially, we identify the change in credit supply associated with bank ex-
posure to import penetration through multi-bank firms, as in Khwaja and Mian
(2008). By focusing on these companies, we can saturate the cross-section re-
gression with firm fixed effects δf and leverage the variation of bank-firm credit
within any given firm. Since the firm fixed effect absorbs the unobserved firm
credit demand, then any remaining variation in lending comes from supply mo-
tives. Although the focus of multi-bank firms reduces the size of our sample,
in our data the vast majority of firms receive credit by more than one bank
throughout the period 2000-2006.
The identification of the credit supply channel hinges on two key assumptions:
(i) firms’ credit demand is held constant across banks and (ii) changes in credit
supply do not vary systematically across firms. This second assumption is chal-
lenged by the evidence of Paravisini et al. (2017), which highlight the presence of
firm- and sector-specific patterns in credit supply due to bank specialization. To
address this issue, we also explicitly control in the regression for both a measure
of lending relationship at the firm-bank level, and bank specialization across in-
dustries and provinces as in De Jonghe et al. (2019). This approach allows us to
elicit an identification strategy which isolates the role of bank exposure to China
on credit supply that holds above and beyond any pattern of bank specialization
at the firm-, sectoral-, and province-level.3 Moreover, the fact that our finding
on the bank portfolio reallocation out of exposed manufacturing firms towards
non-exposed sectors – and especially construction firms – could not be explained
by bank specialization mitigates even further the concerns of Paravisini et al.
(2017) on our identification approach.
Importantly, the Spanish economy represents an ideal case to study the effects
of Chinese import competition on credit supply, as firms are highly bank depen-
3Moreover, Amiti and Weistein (2018) show that bank specialization does not bias our estimates of interest
as long as bank exposure ΔIPb,2000−2006 is truly exogenous with respect to the omitted factors subsumed in
the error term.
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dent (e.g., Delgado et al., 2007). For instance, only 94 Spanish non-financial
groups had issued a bond at any time between 2006 and 2015 (e.g., Arce et al.
2018). In this way, we can exclude the possibility that any variation in bank
loans is substituted with alternative sources of financing
Column (1) of Table 4 reports the results of the regression (7) estimated
with OLS methods. We find that bank exposure to Chinese competition has
had an asymmetric effect on firms depending on firm direct exposure to Chinese
imports. Indeed, we estimate a highly statistically significant coefficient β1, which
implies that exposed banks have increased their lending towards firms in non-
exposed industries. Instead, the fact that the estimated sign of the coefficient β2
is negative – and also highly statistically significant – implies that exposed banks
reduced the supply of credit to firms that were facing competing pressures from
China.
Column (2) shows the results of the estimation in which the sectoral and the
bank index of import penetration ΔIPs,2000−2006 and ΔIPb,2000−2006 are instru-
mented with the indexes that use the imports of Chinese goods in a pool of
non-E.U. advanced economies, that is, ΔIP s,2000−2006 and ΔIP

b,2000−2006. This
approach raises slightly the magnitude of the coefficients, while maintaining the
high statistical significance of both the cut in the supply of credit to exposed
sectors and the increase in the lending to non-exposed firms. The results do not
change if we use the alternative instrumental strategy of Column (3), in which
ΔIPs,2000−2006 and ΔIPb,2000−2006 are instrumented with shipping costs SCs,2000
and SCb,2000, as in Bernard et al. (2006), Valta (2012), and Barrot et al. (2018,
2019). Overall, all these results highlight that bank exposure to China has trig-
gered changes in the supply of credit that have affected asymmetrically firms,
with banks reducing the share of loans to exposed firms in their portfolios.
Table 5 digs deeper in banks’ loan portfolio reallocation, by running regression
(7) on four different samples: we run one regression using data on exposed man-
ufacturing firms, a regression using data on non-exposed manufacturing firms,
then we focus on a sample of services firms, and finally we look at construction
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Note: This table reports the results of a regression in which the dependent variable is
ΔCb,f,s,2000−2006, the change in the credit between bank b and firm f between 2000
and 2006, and the independent variables are the change in bank import penetration
ΔIPb,2000−2006 and the change in sectoral import penetration ΔIPs,2000−2006, and bank
controls, such as the size of the balance sheet (i.e., log of total assets), the liquidity
ratio (i.e., the ratio of cash plus fixed income over total assets), leverage (i.e., the ratio
of net worth over total assets), the fraction of NPLs (i.e., the ratio of doubtful assets
over total assets), ROA (i.e., the ratio of EBITDA over assets), sector specialization
(i.e., the fraction of credit granted to firms in a given sector over total credit), province
specialization (i.e., the fraction of credit granted to firms in a given province over
total credit), and relationship lending (e.g., a dummy variable that equals 1 if bank
b is the bank with the highest share of credit for firm f). The regression includes
firm fixed effects. Column (1) reports the results for the case in which the regression
is estimated using OLS. Column (2) reports the results for the case in which the
regression is estimated using IV, in which the change in bank exposure to Chinese
imports ΔIPb,2000−2006 and the change in the sectoral exposure to Chinese imports
ΔIPs,2000−2006 are instrumented using ΔIP b,2000−2006 and ΔIP

s,2000−2006, respectively.
These instruments are derived by exploiting the change in the sectoral import penetration
of a pool of non-E.U. advanced economies. Column (3) reports the results for the case
in which the regression is estimated using IV, in which the change in bank exposure
to Chinese imports ΔIPb,2000−2006 and the change in the sectoral exposure to Chinese
imports ΔIPs,2000−2006 are instrumented using SCb,2000 and SCs,2000, respectively.
These instruments are derived by exploiting the shipping costs computed by Bernard et
al. (2006). In all cases, standard errors clustered at the industry-location-size level are
reported in brackets. , , and  indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and
1%, respectively.
Table 4: Bank Exposure to China and Credit Supply.
Dependent Variable: ΔCb,f,s,2000−2006
(1) (2) (3)
OLS IV IV
Shipping Costs
ΔIPb,2000−2006 1.585 1.945 1.390
(0.306) (0.335) (0.391)
ΔIPb,2000−2006 ×ΔIPs,2000−2006 -13.313 -16.992 -13.996
(5.785) (7.710) (7.878)
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Bank Controls YES YES YES
R2 0.460 - -
Observations 249,782 249,782 249,782
and real estate companies. The results highlight once again that exposed banks
have reduced their supply of credit to exposed manufacturing firms, while rais-
ing lending to firms in all non-exposed sectors. Again, these results hold true
independently on whether we estimate the regression with OLS or IV methods.
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Table 5: The Effect of Bank Exposure to China on Credit Supply - Evidence Across Sectors.
Dependent Variable: ΔCb,f,s,2000−2006
Exposed Non-Exposed Services Construction
Manufacturing Manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
ΔIPb,2000−2006 0.825 1.668 1.877 2.039 1.668 2.218 2.029 2.128
(0.629) (0.741) (0.478) (0.496) (0.721) (0.776) (0.681) (0.753)
ΔIPb,2000−2006 × -10.310 -17.231
ΔIPs,2000−2006 (6.134) (9.591)
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.409 - 0.450 - 0.535 - 0.503 -
Observations 75,395 75,395 94,521 94,521 33,092 33,092 46,774 46,774
Note: This table reports the results of a regression in which the dependent variable is ΔCb,f,s,2000−2006, the change in the credit between bank b and
firm f between 2000 and 2006, and the independent variables are the change in bank import penetration ΔIPb,2000−2006 and the change in sectoral
import penetration ΔIPs,2000−2006, and bank controls as in Table 4. The regression includes firm fixed effects. Column (1) reports the results for
the case in which the regression is estimated using OLS on a sample of exposed manufacturing firms. Column (3) reports the results for the case in
which the regression is estimated using OLS on a sample of non-exposed manufacturing firms. Column (5) reports the results for the case in which the
regression is estimated using OLS on a sample of services firms. Column (7) reports the results for the case in which the regression is estimated using
OLS on a sample of construction firms. Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) report the results for the case in which the regression is estimated using IV,
in which the change in bank exposure to Chinese imports ΔIPb,2000−2006 and the change in the sectoral exposure to Chinese imports ΔIPs,2000−2006
are instrumented using ΔIP b,2000−2006 and ΔIP

s,2000−2006, respectively. These instruments are derived by exploiting the change in the sectoral import
penetration of a pool of non-E.U. advanced economies. In all cases, standard errors clustered at the industry-location-size level are reported in brackets.
, , and  indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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If we use the OLS results to gauge the economic implications of these re-
gressions, we find that a one standard deviation increase in bank exposure to
Chinese imports reduced the amount of credit at the bank-firm pair in the ex-
posed manufacturing sector by 3.5%. Instead, the portfolio rebalancing of ex-
The findings of the paper do not depend on the way we identify changes in
the supply of credit by isolating the role of firms’ credit demand. Indeed, the
results do not change if we consider an alternative setting to control for demand.
Table 6 keeps looking at the effects of bank exposure to China on the change in
credit across the four macro-sectors, but this time rather than isolating demand
by focusing on multi-bank firms so to saturate the regression with firm fixed
effects, we consider two alternative approaches. First, we consider multi-bank
firms but control for credit demand with the combination of province-sector fixed
effects and firm controls. Second, we keep controlling for credit demand with the
combination of province-sector fixed effects and firm controls, but we extend the
sample to all firms in our dataset.
Table 7 looks at the effects of Chinese competition on the changes in credit
supply to firms within the four different macro-sectors, but this time considers
bank specialization in exposed manufacturing firms in 2000, defined in Equation
(6), as the measure of bank exposure to foreign import penetration. This al-
ternative measure of bank exposure to exposed manufacturing firms is a special
case of the bank exposure index of Equation (3) which abstracts from the vari-
ation of the index of import penetration across sectors ΔIPs,2000−2006. Hence,
bank specialization in exposed manufacturing firms embeds less variation across
financial institutions in their exposure to China than the baseline bank index of
import penetration. Consistently with this notion, the results indicate that the
posed banks generated an increase in the credit at the bank-firm pair by 5.4%
for non-exposed manufacturing firms, 4.8% for services firms, and 5.9% for con-
struction firms. Hence, the economic magnitude of the bank portfolio reshuffling
towards non-exposed industries is largest within construction firms.
3.2 Further Evidence
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Table 6: Bank Exposure to China and Credit Supply - Alternative Credit Demand Controls.
Dependent Variable: ΔCb,f,s,2000−2006
Exposed Non-Exposed Services Construction
Manufacturing Manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Multi All Multi All Multi All Multi All
Bank Firms Bank Firms Bank Firms Bank Firms
Firms Firms Firms Firms
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
ΔIPb,2000−2006 0.933 0.938 1.758 1.842 1.644 1.366 2.289 2.066
(0.596) (0.540) (0.460) (0.404) (0.671) (0.523) (0.612) (0.522)
ΔIPb,2000−2006 × -11.469 -9.615
ΔIPs,2000−2006 (6.374) (5.635)
Firm Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Sector-Province YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Fixed Effects
Firm Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.179 0.198 0.177 0.210 0.296 0.352 0.219 0.283
Observations 75,395 84,521 94,521 111,060 33,092 44,871 46,774 59,403
Note: This table reports the results obtained by the same regressions of Table 5, with the only difference being the alternative settings to control for
credit demand. Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) uses multi-bank firms and controls for demand with the combination of province-sector fixed effects and
firms covariates, which consist of leverage, the liquidity ratio, the return on assets, and size measured as the logarithm of assets. Columns (2), (4),
(5), and (6) consider instead all firms and controls for demand with the combination of province-sector fixed effects and firms covariates.
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surge in credit from banks specialized in exposed manufacturing firms towards
both non-exposed manufacturing firms and services firms is not statistically sig-
nificant anymore. Nonetheless, even with this measure we do find that exposed
banks cut the supply of credit to exposed manufacturing firms, while raising lend-
ing to construction companies. This finding confirms once more that the bank
portfolio reallocation due to the exposure to Chinese imports has been especially
tilted towards the construction sector.
Then, we study whether the changes in bank-firm credit due to bank and
sectoral exposure to China competition worked mainly through either an exten-
sive margin, such that exposed banks changed their decisions on the definition
of new lending relationships, or an intensive margin, such that exposed banks
altered the amount of credit which is granted to firms with established relation-
ships. To isolate the role of the extensive margin, we run a regression in which
Table 7: Bank Specialization in Exposed Manufacturing Firms and Credit Supply.
Dependent Variable: ΔCb,f,s,2000−2006
Exposed Non-Exposed Services Construction
Manufacturing Manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
SPECb,2000 -0.052 -0.020 0.058 0.118

(0.042) (0.033) (0.047) (0.044)
SPECb,2000 × -0.788
ΔIPs,2000−2006 (0.463)
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES
R2 0.409 0.450 0.534 0.503
Observations 75,395 94,521 33,092 46,774
Note: This table reports the results of regressions at the bank-firm level as in Table 4 in which
the main independent variable is bank specialization in exposed manufacturing firms, defined as
the share of credit to these firms in the overall bank corporate loan portfolio, as of 2000.
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the dependent variable is an indicator function which equals 1 in case we observe
the establishment of a new credit relationship with a given bank and given firm
between 2000 and 2006. Instead, we isolate the role of the intensive margin by
looking into the change in lending over the period 2000-2006 between a given
bank and a given firm, conditional on this bank-firm pair being already estab-
lished in 2000. The results of Table 8 point out that the reduction in the supply
of credit of exposed banks towards firms in the exposed manufacturing industries
worked through both the intensive and extensive margins. On the other hand,
while the rise in lending towards firms in non-exposed manufacturing industries
and services worked only through the intensive margin, the extra supply of credit
to construction firms was channeled both by establishing new credit relationships
and by raising the amount of lending to firms with established bank connections.
So far, we have been looking at the effects of bank exposure to Chinese import
penetration on the change in the supply of credit between a given bank-firm
pair. This level of analysis allowed us to exploit within-firm variation such that
we could isolate firms’ credit demand and identify the variation in banks’ credit
supply. Nevertheless, the drop in the supply of credit between a given exposed
bank and a given exposed firm could be offset if the exposed firm manages to
receive additional lending from other financial institutions. To verify whether
the changes in bank exposure to China do alter the overall credit of firms, we
run the following regression at the firm-level using only the sample of multi-bank
Δ ˆIP b,2000−2006 =
∑
bCb,f,s,2000 ×ΔIP b,2000−2006∑
bCb,f,s,2000
. (9)
firms
ΔCf,s,2000−2006 = β1Δ ˆIP b,2000−2006 + β2ΔIPs,2000−2006 + . . .
· · ·+X′f ,s,2000β3 +X′s,2000β4 + δˆf + f,s,2000−2006 (8)
Basically, this new variable weights the bank exposure indexes with the share of
credit between firm f and each bank with which the firm has a relationship. In
where we define the bank exposure to Chinese competition at the firm-level
Δ ˆIP b,2000−2006 as
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Table 8: Bank Exposure to China and Credit Supply - Extensive and Intensive Margins.
Dependent Variable: ΔCb,f,s,2000−2006
Exposed Non-Exposed Services Construction
Manufacturing Manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
New Firms with New Firms with New Firms with New Firms with
Credit relationship Credit relationship Credit relationship Credit relationship
(0/1) in 2000 (0/1) in 2000 (0/1) in 2000 (0/1) in 2000
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
ΔIPb,2000−2006 -1.344 0.871 0.341 1.910 0.389 1.900 1.015 2.167
(0.526) (0.646) (0.451) (0.494) (0.580) (0.766) (0.535) (0.715)
ΔIPb,2000−2006 × -12.487 -11.391
ΔIPs,2000−2006 (6.374) (5.635)
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.452 0.389 0.0.492 0.429 0.592 0.499 0.555 0.470
Observations 75,395 73,259 94,521 91,299 33,092 30,701 46,774 43,937
Note: This table reports the results of regressions analogous to those in Table 5, with the only difference that the dependent variable in
Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) is an indicator function that equals 1 if between 2000 and 2006 we observe a new bank-firm pair which was
not established as of 2000, whereas in Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) the dependent variable is the change in credit of a given bank-firm pair
between 2000 and 2006, conditional on observing the bank-firm pair as already established as of 2000.
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the limiting case in which firm f has only a lending relationship, then the new
variable Δ ˆIP b,2000−2006 coincides with the bank exposure index ΔIP b,2000−2006.
The regression also includes a set of firm characteristicsX′f ,s,2000, which consist
of leverage, the liquidity ratio, the return on assets, and size measured in terms
of assets, a set of sector characteristics X′s,2000, which consist of the sectoral
averages of each firm control, and both sectoral and province fixed effects. Since
we now study changes in credit at the firm-level, we cannot employ anymore firm
fixed-effects to isolate firms’ credit demand and identify changes in the supply of
credit. Hence, the estimates on the effects of bank exposure to China on changes
in credit supply at the firm-level could be biased if bank exposure does correlate
with firms’ credit demand. To address this concern, we follow the insights of
Bonaccorsi di Piatti and Sette (2016), Cingano et al. (2016), and Jimenez et al.
(2019), by adding to the regression the firm fixed effect δˆf as estimated in the
bank-firm-level regression (7).
The results of Columns (1) - (4) in Table 9 show that even if we look at
the changes in the entire amount of firms’ credit, we still observe that exposed
manufacturing firms experienced in drop in the supply of lending from exposed
banks, whereas firms in non-exposed industries experienced a surge in the supply
of credit.
Finally, we look at the changes in the total amount of lending at the bank level.
Indeed, the results of the regressions at the bank-firm-level do not reveal whether
either bank exposure to Chinese competition has caused a decline in the total
amount of bank corporate loans, or banks did not change the size of their balance
sheets, and just perfectly offset the reduction in the supply of credit to exposed
manufacturing firms with an increase in lending to non-exposed industries. To
evaluate the effects of bank exposure to import competition on the size of bank
corporate loan portfolios, we run the following regression at the bank-level
ΔCb,2000−2006 = β1ΔIP b,2000−2006 +X′b,2000β2 + δˆb + b,2000−2006. (10)
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The regression includes the same set of bank controls of regression (7), and
includes also the estimated firm fixed effects, such as we can control for the
possible role of changes in firm credit demand. Given the estimates of firm fixed
effects of regression (7), we define the new set of fixed effects δˆb as
δˆb =
∑
f Cb,f,s,2000 × δˆf∑
f Cb,f,s,2000
(11)
which weights the estimated firm fixed effects δˆf by the share of credit of the
bank-firm pair on the overall size of bank corporate loans.
Column (5) of Table 9 shows that the coefficient that relates the changes in the
overall size of bank corporate loans to bank exposure to Chinese imports is not
statistically significant. This finding implies that exposed banks did not shrink
their balance sheets, but rather completely offset the reduction in the supply of
credit to exposed manufacturing firms with the rise in lending to non-exposed
industries.
Overall these results adds to the literature on the role of banks’ internal capi-
tal markets (e.g., Gan, 2007; Houston et al., 2007; Desai et al., 2008; Gilje et al.,
2016; Cortes and Strahan, 2017; Chakraborty et al., 2018; Cun˜at et al., 2018;
Martin et al., 2018), which tends to focus on how banks propagate either pos-
itive or negative shocks across different geographical regions or lending types.
Instead, we document banks reallocation of loan portfolios across different indus-
tries, as in Martin et al. (2018) and De Jonghe et al. (2019). From this point
of view, the rise of Chinese imports can be interpreted as a negative shock to
the ability to repay debt obligations to firms operating in industries facing this
extra amount of competition, and banks used their internal capital markets to
reallocate their portfolios aways from these industries. This mechanism resem-
bles the theory emphasized by Stein (1997) and Scharfstein and Stein (2000),
in which a constrained business reallocates its limited resources from the least
deserving project to the most profitable ones. In this sense, our closest paper is
Chakraborty et al. (2018), which documents how banks’ exposure to the housing
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Table 9: Bank Exposure to China and Credit Supply - Firm-Level and Bank-Level Evidence.
Dependent Variable: ΔCf,s,2000−2006 Dependent Variable: ΔCb,2000−2006
Exposed Non-Exposed Services Construction All Banks
Manufacturing Manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Δ ˆIP b,2000−2006 6.800 7.183 8.282 7.457
(2.874) (2.162) (3.356) (3.667)
ΔIPs,2000−2006 -37.888
(14.186)
ΔIPb,2000−2006 10.235
(6.495)
Sector 1-digit & Province YES YES YES YES NO
Fixed Effects
Credit Demand Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Firm & Sector Controls YES YES YES YES NO
Bank Controls NO NO NO NO YES
R2 0.314 0.309 0.248 0.318 0.121
Observations 25,189 36,699 17,076 21,076 162
Note: Columns (1) - (4) of this table report the results of a regression in which the dependent variable is ΔCf,s,2000−2006, the change in the credit of firm f
in sector s between 2000 and 2006, and the independent variables are the change in bank import penetration defined at the firm-level Δ ˆIP b,2000−2006 and the
change in sectoral import penetration ΔIPs,2000−2006, firm controls as in Table 6, sector controls defined as the sector average of the variables used as firm
controls, 1-digit sector fixed effects, province fixed effects, and credit demand controls in the form of the estimated firm-fixed effect from the bank-firm-level
regressions. In all these four columns, standard errors clustered at the industry-location-size level are reported in brackets. Column (5) reports the results of
a regression in which the dependent variable is ΔCb,2000−2006, the change in the credit of bank b between 2000 and 2006, and the independent variables are
the change in bank import penetration ΔIP b,2000−2006 and bank controls, such as the size of the balance sheet, the liquidity ratio, leverage, the fraction of
NPLs, ROA, sector specialization, province specialization, relationship lending, and estimated firm fixed effects from the bank-firm-level regressions, which
are then defined at the bank level by weighting the fixed-effect of each firm with the share of credit of that firm over the overall credit position of the bank.
In this case, standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in brackets. , , and  indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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price boom generate a crowding-out of credit from commercial lending towards
mortgage lending. The next section shows that our findings do not hinge on the
crowding-out channel emphasized by Chakraborty et al. (2018), and that the
effects of bank exposure to China on bank portfolio reallocation hold above and
beyond bank exposure to the housing price boom in the early 2000s.
4 The Portfolio Reallocation To Construction
The reallocation of credit supply from exposed manufacturing to non-exposed
industries – and especially to construction – could be driven by confounding fac-
tors that in the early 2000s were shaping changes in the sectoral allocation of
credit. For instance, Chakraborty et al. (2018), Cun˜at et al. (2018), Martin
et al. (2018) show that banks reacted to the housing boom by shifting their
loans to construction firms and mortgage lending. In addition, bank exposure to
China competition could also capture a variation in lending policies associated
to the process of structural transformation out of manufacturing (e.g., Bustos et
al., 2016, 2017). Nevertheless, this possibility looks less likely as it is is inconsis-
tent with the fact that exposed bank adjusted their loan portfolios even within
the manufacturing sector, from exposed to non-exposed industries. This section
shows that the effect of bank exposure to China on the surge in lending towards
construction holds above and beyond these alternative channels.
We first run a placebo exercise to show that the effects of bank exposure to
Chinese imports on credit supply does not capture any other systematic con-
founding factor. To do so, we change the definition of bank exposure by focusing
on bank specialization in non-exposed manufacturing firms as of 2000, and evalu-
ate whether also this alternative measure implies a change in credit across sectors
from 2000 to 2006. Bank specialization is defined as in Equation (6), with the
only difference that we now focus on those manufacturing firms which operate
in sectors which have not been affected by Chinese import competition. Table
10 reports the results of this placebo. We find that although banks specialized
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in non-manufacturing firms tend to diversify their portfolios and reduce their
exposure to these firms, there is no reallocation whatsoever to other sectors, and
especially to construction firms. This finding confirms that the portfolio switch-
ing towards the construction sector does indeed depend on bank exposure to
China, defined as the exposure of bank corporate loan portfolios towards firms
operating in sectors facing the highest degree of competition from Chinese goods.
Hence, our empirical strategy isolates the role of rising foreign imports on banks’
credit supply policies and does not capture any alternative confounding factor,
such as any systematic rebalancing of bank portfolios out of the manufacturing
sectors and towards construction firms.
Then, we dig deeper on the factors that determine bank portfolio reallocation
to the construction firms. First, we show that banks’ exposure to Chinese imports
generates a surge in the supply of credit towards the construction industry which
holds above and beyond bank exposure to the early 2000s housing boom. To do
Note: This table reports the results of regressions at the bank-firm level as in Table 7 in which the main
independent variable is bank specialization in non-exposed manufacturing firms, defined as the share of credit
to these firms in the overall bank corporate loan portfolio, as of 2000.
Table 10: Placebo Exercise.
Dependent Variable: ΔCb,f,s,2000−2006
Exposed Non-Exposed Services Construction
Manufacturing Manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Credit to Non-Exp Manufb,2000 / 0.052 -0.092
 0.063 0.029
Total Creditb,2000 (0.036) (0.033) (0.044) (0.044)
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES
R2 0.409 0.450 0.534 0.503
Observations 75,395 94,521 33,092 46,774
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so, we add to our baseline regression two further controls. Column (1) of Table
11 introduces the share of mortgage-backed credit in overall bank credit as of
1997, a variable that Martin et al. (2018) use to capture bank exposure to the
housing price boom and the related shifts in bank lending towards construction.
Instead, Column (2) introduces a measure of house price change defined at the
bank-level using the same approach of Chakraborty et al. (2018): we weight the
house price change in a given province with the share of credit that a given bank
allocates to that province, and then sum over all provinces. Chakraborty et al.
(2018) show that a higher housing appreciation at the bank-level predicts a shift
in credit out of the corporate sector towards mortgages. The results of Table 11
highlight that the coefficients associated to the change in the supply of credit
to construction firms due to bank exposure to Chinese competition keeps being
highly statistically significant even after controlling for these additional measures
of bank exposure to house price boom of the early 2000s.
Then, we highlight that the credit reallocation to construction depends on
the characteristics of the local economic activity faced by banks. Indeed, banks
reallocate their loan portfolios to construction firms in case they operate in areas
with fewer outside opportunities out of both exposed manufacturing and con-
struction firms. We measure the investment opportunities that all banks face in
a given province p in 2000 as
IOp,2000 =
∑
bC
ExpManuf
b,p,2000∑
b
(
CExpManufb,p,2000 + C
NonExpManuf
b,p,2000 + C
Serv
b,p,2000
) (12)
which defines for each province the fraction of bank lending that goes to exposed
manufacturing firms over the bank lending to all firms but those operating in
construction. This variable takes higher values if in a given province there are
fewer opportunities out both exposed manufacturing firms and construction firms.
If a bank operates in these areas, then the only way it may reshuffle its loan
portfolio out of exposed manufacturing firms is by raising lending to construction
companies. The result in Column (3) confirms this hypothesis by showing that
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 40 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1908
Note: This table reports the results of regressions at the bank-firm level as in
Table 4, in which we consider additional control variables. Column (1) adds the
share of mortgage-backed credit in overall bank credit as of 1997. Column (2)
adds a measure of house price change defined as the bank-level, which weights
the changes in house price at the province level with the shares of credit that a
given bank gives to each province. Column (3) considers the two former controls,
and adds the interaction of bank exposure to Chinese imports ΔIPb,2000−2006
with a variable IOp,2000, which defines (the inverse of) bank investment opportuni-
ties outside of exposed manufacturing-firms and construction firms for each province p.
positive and statistically significant.
This finding indicates that the increase in the supply of credit to construction
firms is stronger if banks operate in areas with fewer investment opportunities
out of exposed manufacturing industries. The marked spatial agglomeration of
manufacturing industries (e.g., Krugman, 1991; Ellison and Glaeser, 1997; Ellison
et al., 2010) implies that banks with highly geographically concentrated lending
could mainly shield their balance sheet from the decline in profitability of the
industries competing with Chinese imports by shifting their loans to construction
firms.
the coefficient on the interaction between ΔIPb,2000−2006 and IOp,2000 is highly
Table 11: The Loan Portfolio Reallocation Towards Construction.
Dependent Variable: ΔCb,f,s,2000−2006
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS OLS
ΔIPb,2000−2006 4.842 1.195 4.388
(0.707) (0.724) (0.747)
ΔIPb,2000−2006 × IOp,2000 13.294
(4.425)
Mortgage-Backed Creditb,1997 / 0.332
 0.319
Total Creditb,1997 (0.026) (0.026)
Δ House Priceb,2000−2006 0.162 0.085
(0.041) (0.043)
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Bank Controls YES YES YES
R2 0.506 0.503 0.516
Observations 46,774 46,774 46,774
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The previous sections have shown that banks exposed to Chinese import com-
petition have reshuffled their corporate loan portfolios, by cutting the supply of
credit to firms operating in sectors directly competing with Chinese goods, while
raising the lending towards non-exposed industries, and in particular towards
construction firms. In this section we evaluate whether the bank portfolio real-
location shaped only the dynamics of the corporate loan market, or if it had real
effects by affecting the economic activity of Spanish firms.
To quantify the real effects of the bank portfolio reallocation, we focus on
three key outcomes: value added, sales, and the number of employees. Then,
we study to what extent the change in each of these variables between 2000
and 2006 has been influenced by the direct exposure of each firm to Chinese
competition, ΔIPs,2000−2006, and by the exposure of the banks associated with
each firm Δ ˆIP b,2000−2006, which is defined as in Equation (9). To do so, we focus
where ΔYf,s,2000−2006 is the relative change between 2000 and 2006 of one of the
three real outcomes of firm f operating in industry s (i.e., value added, sales,
and employment).
Importantly, each regression includes a set of firm characteristics X′f ,s,2000,
which consist of leverage, the liquidity ratio, the return on assets, and size mea-
sured in logarithm of assets, a set of sector characteristics X′s,2000, which consist
of the sectoral averages of each firm control, and both sectoral and province fixed
effects. In addition, we also control for the firm fixed effect as estimated in the
baseline bank-firm-level regression on the change in credit, such as that we can
control for the estimated firm credit demand.
Table 12 reports the results for the regression on the change in value added
across exposed manufacturing firms, non-exposed manufacturing firms, services
firms, and construction firms, whereas Table 13 and Table 14 report similar
on multi-bank firms and run the regression
ΔYf,s,2000−2006 = β1ΔIPs,2000−2006 + β2Δ ˆIP b,2000−2006 +X′f ,s,2000β3 + . . .
· · ·+X′s,2000β4 + δs + δprovince + δˆf + f,2000−2006 (13)
5 Real Effects
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results for the case in which the dependent variable is the change in total sales
and the change in the number of employees, respectively.
The credit supply channel of foreign import penetration had large real effects.
In addition to confirming the findings of previous studies indicating that rising
imports depressed the economic activity of firms operating in sector subject to
the competition of Chinese goods, we highlight a new channel through which
these firms experienced a further drop in their real outcomes triggered by the
cut in the supply of credit from exposed banks. This novel mechanism accounts
for between one third and two thirds of the negative effects due to firms’ direct
exposure to foreign imports. On the one hand, a one-standard deviation increase
in the direct sectoral exposure to Chinese imports reduced sales, value added, and
employment in exposed manufacturing firms between 2000 and 2006 by 24.1%,
17.2%, and 10%, respectively. On the other hand, a one-standard deviation
increase in bank exposure to Chinese imports reduced sales, value added, and
employment in exposed manufacturing firms by 8.3%, 6%, and 7.5%.
Banks’ portfolio reallocation triggered a surge in the real outcomes on firms in
non-exposed sectors. This channel is only relevant for construction firms, as the
effects on non-exposed manufacturing firms and services firms is not statistically
significant. A one-standard deviation increase in bank exposure to China raised
sales, value added, and employment of the construction sector between 2000 and
2006 by roughly 6%.
The rationale of the differential effects of bank credit reallocation towards
non-exposed sectors on the real effects of firms operating in industries, with only
construction companies experiencing a surge in their economic activity, is twofold.
First, although banks reallocate their loan portfolios towards firms in all these
non-exposed sectors, the evidence on the surge in credit supply to construction
firms is stronger and more robust across all specifications. Second, while the rise
in lending towards non-exposed manufacturing and services firms worked only
through the intensive margin, the extra supply of credit to construction firms
was channeled both through the intensive and extensive margin. This is relevant
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Table 12: Real Effects - Value Added.
Dependent Variable: ΔValue Addedf,s,2000−2006
Exposed Non-Exposed Services Construction
Manufacturing Manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Δ ˆIP b,2000−2006 -2.764 -3.618 -1.869 -2.416 -1.891 -1.620 3.404 6.543
(6.374) (1.753) (5.635) (1.477) (6.374) (2.079) (5.635) (1.816)
ΔIPs,2000−2006 -0.699 -0.057
(0.526) (0.154)
Sector 1-digit Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Province Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Credit Demand Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sector Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.097 - 0.095 - 0.083 - 0.106 -
Observations 23,555 23,555 35,441 35,441 15,181 15,181 18,173 18,173
This table reports the results of a regression in which the dependent variable is the change in the value added of firm f between 2000 and
2006, and the independent variables are the change in bank import penetration defined at the firm level Δ ˆIP b,2000−2006 and the change in
sectoral import penetration ΔIPs,2000−2006, firm controls in Table 6, sector controls defined as the sector average of the variables used as
firm controls, 1-digit sector fixed effects, province fixed effects, and credit demand controls in the form of the estimated firm-fixed effect from
the bank-firm-level regressions. Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) report the results for the case in which the regression is estimated using IV,
in which Δ ˆIP b,2000−2006 and ΔIPs,2000−2006 are instrumented using Δ ˆIP

b,2000−2006 and ΔIP

s,2000−2006, respectively. These instruments are
derived by exploiting the change in the sectoral import penetration of a pool of non-E.U. advanced economies. In all cases, standard errors
clustered at the industry-location level are reported in brackets. , , and  indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 13: Real Effects - Sales.
Dependent Variable: ΔSalesf,s,2000−2006
Exposed Non-Exposed Services Construction
Manufacturing Manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Δ ˆIP b,2000−2006 -3.404 -4.590 -1.324 -1.427 -0.897 -1.117 4.334 5.811
(1.770) (2.040) (1.827) (2.056) (2.184) (2.971) (2.418) (2.347)
ΔIPs,2000−2006 -0.699 -0.057
(0.526) (0.154)
Sector 1-digit Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Province Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Credit Demand Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sector Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.111 - 0.098 - 0.067 - 0.106 -
Observations 23,555 23,555 35,441 35,441 15,181 15,181 18,173 18,173
Note: This table reports the results obtained by the same regressions of Table 12 with the only difference that the dependent variable is the
change of firm sales between 2000 and 2006.
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Table 14: Real Effects - Employees.
Dependent Variable: ΔEmployeesf,s,2000−2006
Exposed Non-Exposed Services Construction
Manufacturing Manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Δ ˆIP b,2000−2006 -0.538 -0.667 -0.049 0.060 0.078 -0.097 0.374 0.547
(0.237) (0.212) (0.193) (0.213) (0.275) (0.350) (0.210) (0.208)
ΔIPs,2000−2006 -0.065 -0.032
(0.019) (0.023)
Sector 1-digit Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Province Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Credit Demand Controlx YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sector Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.045 - 0.050 - 0.035 - 0.055 -
Observations 23,555 23,555 35,441 35,441 15,181 15,181 18,173 18,173
Note: This table reports the results obtained by the same regressions of Table 12 with the only difference that the dependent variable is the
change in the number of firm employees between 2000 and 2006.
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as Midrigan and Xu (2014) show that changes in firms’ financial frictions have
larger aggregate effects when propagating through the extensive margin, whereas
the intensive margin amplification is small.
These results add to the debate on the effects of rising Chinese competition on
advanced economies. The literature so far has highlighted how firms operating
in sectors more exposed to competitive pressures from Chinese imports experi-
6 Conclusion
This paper studies the effects of the rising Chinese import penetration in the early
2000s on the Spanish corporate loan market. In particular, we show that banks
have reshuffled their loan portfolios by cutting the supply of credit to firms in
exposed sectors, and increased the lending to non-exposed industries. Then, we
investigate the real effects of the changes in credit supply due to banks’ exposure
to the rise of China. We look at the changes of firms’ value added, sales, and
employment between 2000 and 2006 and find that firms in sectors exposed to
Chinese competition have suffered a further decline in their economic activity
due to the cut in the supply of credit. Quantitatively, this channel accounts for
between a third and two thirds of the reduction in firms’ economic activity due to
their direct exposure to Chinese imports. Overall, these results highlight a novel
amplification channel through which the rise of Chinese imports have affected
manufacturing industries in advanced economies.
enced a sharp drop in profitability, sales, employment, capital expenditures, and
innovation (e.g., Xu, 2012; Acemoglu et al., 2016; Bloom et al., 2016; Pierce
and Schott, 2016; Autor et al., 2017a; Hombert and Matray, 2018). We add
to these findings on two dimensions. First, we highlight a novel amplification
channel, through which changes in the supply of credit towards firms in exposed
manufacturing industries generate a further drop in firms’ economic activity.
Second, bank exposure to China implies a reallocation of bank lending towards
non-exposed sectors. In particular, this spillover effect has generated a rise in
the economic activity of the construction firms.
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